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The Hierarchy of Value Capture

The more value a protocol captures, the harder that value is to defend.

Consider an exchange that saves a trader $10 on a swap. If $1 goes to token holders as a fee, the trader keeps $9 of the benefit. The exchange could charge $8 and the trade would still be worthwhile. But what happens when a competitor offers the same swap for $2?

This is the tradeoff between two of the principles of tokenomics. Protocol utility is the value a protocol creates for its users. Value capture is the value that accrues to the token through its role in the protocol.

We can order tokenomic mechanisms by how much value they capture. The further up this hierarchy a protocol goes, the more it needs to offer users that they can’t get elsewhere.

Defensibility

A castle surrounded by a moat

Defensibility is a protocol’s ability to keep its users when a competitor offers comparable utility. A monopoly sits at one end of the spectrum. As Peter Thiel argues, a business with no close substitute has considerable room to set its price.

In open-source software, competitors can see exactly how the product works. So how do you compete when your competition knows your secrets?

HYPE came up in my conversation with Simon Peters of Xerberus. Hyperliquid uses a portion of its trading fees to buy HYPE. That gives the buyback an equity-like quality. We can estimate what it’s worth from the fees traders are likely to keep paying. A fork can copy the buyback. It still has to attract enough liquidity to give traders a reason to use it.

That liquidity is one source of defensibility. A cheaper exchange can still give the trader a worse price.

Tokenomic leverage

Tokenomic leverage measures how much value a mechanism captures relative to the value the protocol handles. For a fee, that calculation is familiar. If $1 accrues to the token for every $100 traded, the leverage of the fee is 1%.

Collateral works differently.

Synthetix logo

Under Synthetix’s historical 400% collateral target, a user needed $400 worth of SNX to issue $100 of synthetic assets. That’s 4× leverage for the collateral mechanism. The $400 measures how much SNX someone had to hold while the $100 remained outstanding.

Holding time matters here. A token bought to pay a fee can be sold again seconds later. The same token can pay many fees in a day. SNX pledged as collateral had to stay put.

That introduces a tradeoff with economic security. If SNX fell by half, only $200 would back the same $100 of debt, well below the $400 target. Even a protocol with no competitors would still have to manage that risk.

Capturing value creatively

A McDonald’s restaurant with its original golden arches

McDonald’s can earn more from a restaurant without charging more for a burger. It earns rent and royalties from franchisees. A good location is worth paying rent for because it brings in customers. McDonald’s can capture some of that value while keeping the menu competitive.

Protocol designers have the same option. A trader wants a cheap swap. A project issuing a stablecoin wants a market deep enough for its users to make that swap. Those are two different groups, each willing to pay for a different thing.

Curve's CRV

Curve logo

Curve put that distinction to work. Its StableSwap design gives traders a way to swap similarly priced assets with little slippage. Its vote-escrowed token, veCRV, gives projects a way to attract liquidity to a particular pool.

  1. CRV holders lock their tokens for veCRV, which lets them vote on which pools receive newly issued CRV.
  2. A project that wants a deeper pool can pay for votes. That payment, often called a bribe, goes to the voter.
  3. Liquidity providers in the pool receive the CRV emissions. Those rewards give them a reason to supply liquidity even when trading fees are low.

Traders get a deeper pool. The project pays for something it values. And CRV has a source of demand because its holders can decide where those rewards go. The ceiling on what a project will pay for votes is what that extra liquidity is worth to it.

Systemic consequences

A protocol’s choice of mechanism affects what its competitors can charge. Require traders to buy a native token just to pay for a swap and a fork can let them pay the fee in the asset they’re already trading.

Consider Uniswap’s fee switch. If token holders take a share of the existing swap fee, liquidity providers earn less. If the protocol adds a fee on top, traders pay more. An aggregator can route the next trade to whichever pool gives the trader the best price. The trader can switch protocols without even switching interfaces.

Early Uniswap paid the swap fee to liquidity providers and took no cut for a protocol token. That set a difficult price for the next automated market maker to beat. Curve had to offer additional utility to win traders and find another place to capture value. Had Uniswap taken a cut from the start, Curve would have had more room to take one too.

Other exchanges went further, issuing their own tokens to attract liquidity. When the value of those rewards exceeds what traders pay in fees, the exchange is effectively borrowing against future revenues to win users today. The test is whether those users stay when the rewards run out.

Avoid at all FOSS

Tux, the Linux penguin

The risk of capturing too much is that someone forks your protocol and charges less. The risk of capturing too little is familiar to anyone who’s built free and open-source software (FOSS). Users can get enormous value from a product while the people maintaining it struggle to fund the work.

Desktop Linux is the example I keep coming back to. Giving people a free operating system solved one problem. Making it easy enough for the average person to choose over a Mac or a Windows PC took a different kind of work, and that work had to be funded too.

Crypto has an opportunity to do open source differently. A protocol can collect fees, settle small payments, or give a native token a useful job, all while leaving its code open for anyone to inspect or fork.

Conclusion

Start with the user who would still want the product if the token rewards disappeared. What do they come for? What could a competitor offer them? That gives you a reasonable limit on how much you can charge directly.

Then look at the other participants. Curve found a project willing to pay for liquidity. Synthetix found a reason for an issuer to hold SNX, along with a risk that came with using it as collateral. In the Demand-Side Tokenomics Framework, we evaluate those decisions together. A mechanism has to give users a reason to stay, accrue value to the token, and keep the protocol secure.